China's Growing Economic Activity in Africa by Hany Besada et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by Hany Besada, Yang Wang, and John Whalley. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.China’s Growing Economic Activity in Africa 
Hany Besada, Yang Wang, and John Whalley 
NBER Working Paper No. 14024 
May 2008 
JEL No. F13,F59,O53,O55 
ABSTRACT 
Trade between the whole of Africa and China (imports and exports summed) grew from $10.6 billion 
to $73.3 billion between 2000 and 2007, and between Sub-Saharan Africa and China from $7 billion 
to $59 billion over the same period. China is now Africa's third largest trading partner behind the EU 
and the US. The Chinese FDI stock in Africa has grown from $49 million in 1990 to $2.6 billion in 
2006. On the basis of these data, one frequently hears the claim that China is now a dominant influence 
in Africa. Here we both evaluate such claims, and assess what factors underlay this phenomenon. We 
suggest that while the annual growth rates of trade and investment flows are high (around 30% per 
year sine the late 1990's), the levels are still considerably smaller than such claims might suggest. China 
in 2006 accounted for only $520 million of inward FDI compared to a total from all sources of $36 
billion, around 1.4% of total FDI inflows to Africa; and only 8.6% of African exports and 9.6% of 
African imports. African interdependence with China thus remains proportionally smaller than that 
for most other geographical areas, but is growing rapidly. Factors behind this growth are discussed 
in the text. 
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1. Introduction 
Trade between China and the whole of Africa (exports and imports summed) rose from 
$10.6 billion to $73.3 billion between 2000 and 2007
2, growing at rates in the order of 
30% per year. Trade between Sub-Saharan Africa and China increased over the same 
years from $7 billion to $59 billion
3, growing at 30% per year. China has become the 
third largest African trading partner
4, behind the U.S. and EU. FDI inflows to Africa from 
China are now growing at similar rates. China’s FDI outward stock in Africa increased to 
$2.56 billion in 2006 from $49.2 million in 1990 and FDI outflows from China to Africa 
reached $520 million in 2006 up from $1.5 million in 1991.
5 In 2006, China accounted 
for 8.6% of total Africa’s exports and 9.6% of its imports,
6 and 1.4% of the continent’s 
FDI inflows. The value of Chinese Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa 
was $2.3 billion in 2006,
7 or 8.4% of total ODA to Africa. 
China now accounts for around 9% of Africa’s oil and gas exports,
8 and comparable 
amounts of Africa’s other key mineral exports (copper, gold, platinum, manganese, and 
etc). At the margin, China thus appears to be an increasingly substantial engine of growth 
in Africa, and this is for an economy which (at official exchange rates) may still have 
GDP per capita of only US$1500 per year, in contrast to the US$30,000 range for most 
OECD states. For now, the levels are still modest, but growing rapidly. 
In this paper, we document the size and rate of change of this growing presence, focusing 
primarily on trade and finance.
9 We draw on secondary sources, including the recent IMF 
Direction of Trade Statistics 2006 Yearbook, 2006/2007 OECD & AfDB’s African 
Economic Outlook report, UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2006-2007, and the 2007 
UNCTAD’s Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa report and others to provide a 
macro sub-continental picture, but also evaluate its concentration by type (resources, 
construction, etc) and by country. We also discuss its rate of change, and projections of 
its growth. Inevitably, given that these developments are so recent, we are forced to use 
incomplete and often anecdotal information in putting the overall picture together.  




ss_lang=us & http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2007/07051515451001.htm 
3 MOFCOM Statistics 
4 http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/09/news/trip.php 
5 2006 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment & UNCTAD/UNDP, Asian Foreign Direct 
Investment in Africa: Towards a New Era of Cooperation among Developing Nations, New York, March 2007
6 MOFCOM Statistics & UNCTAD Handbook of statistics 2006-07 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=8612&intItemID=1397&lang=1&mode=toc & based on 
our calculations 
7 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07211.pdf 
8 EU and the US account for 36% and 33% respectively of Africa’s oil and gas exports. 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/china-factsheet-chinese.pdf, Nov 2007 












What lies behind these developments seems to involve a number of factors. Clearly 
China’s size and rapid GDP growth are clearly central, and to some degree these 
developments in Africa simply reflect a rapidly growing Chinese engagement globally 
rather than just in Africa. Chinese enterprises are now active in Latin Africa and in 
Europe, particularly in Ireland, Bulgaria and Romania. Some inside and outside China, 
and somewhat tongue-in-cheek, have suggested that growing Chinese presence in all 
these regions reflects Mao’s military strategy in the interwar years in China of 
surrounding the towns (the OECD in global development terms) by expanding the 
villages (Africa, Latin America, and the fringes of Europe). 
But we also argue that there are other factors which come into play in the African case. 
One is clearly China’s concern to achieve more security of supply for resources (and 
especially oil and gas), rather than relying on global markets. Another is the search for 
new avenues to deploy large foreign exchange reserves, and the sense in China of 
potential political opposition in North America (but also in Europe) to proposed reserve 
financed buyouts, for example the Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL) in the 
US three years ago. The strong commitment at the upper echelons of government in 
China to speed the growth and development of countries now poorer than China is also 
important. The approach is to set on one side human rights and governance concerns 
which have restrained OECD flows in the past and directly use commercial arrangements 
to fuel growth and development in Africa; in effect, filling the partial void now left in 
Africa by the OECD. The recent extensive spread of elected governments in Africa and 
infrastructure improvements further fuels these factors. 
Responses to new adjustment resisting trade measures in the OECD against China in 
textiles and apparel as the Multi-Fiber arrangement (MFA) has been terminated as well, 
although the initial reaction of Chinese investors to MFA removal was to repatriate quota 
hopping foreign investment in China. Only subsequently as new measures have been 
applied to China, has barrier circumventing investment in this sector returned (see 
Dayaratna-Banda and Whalley (2007)). But clearly if these OECD adjustment resisting 
measures spread to other product areas (such as autos and electronics), the effect on 
Chinese FDI flows to Africa could be even larger. Also entering from anecdotal accounts 
are responses by Chinese enterprises to attempts in China by government agencies to 
limit corrupt practices by developing new activities in what are seen by such enterprises 
as lax accounting standard countries. Thus, multiple factors driving the recent growth of 
Chinese presence in Africa each seem to play a role. 
The impact of these developments on Africa has been both significant and positive. 
Growth rates have been elevated, and with positive impacts on poverty alleviation. Given 
China’s present and projected expansion in Africa over coming decades, future impacts 
will be even more pronounced. There are issues involving the delivery of this assistance 
(including links to corrupt practices), but in the main these flows provide large and 
largely untied development finance for Africa (in contrast to present conditional OECD 
flows) which impacts directly and positively on living standards and poverty alleviation 
across the continent. And if this presence continues to grow, China may eventually prove 
to be the new African growth engine that the OECD has hesitated to become. 
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Implications follow for OECD policy toward Africa, and we briefly mention other non-
OECD country activity in Africa, including India and Brazil. Africa may thus be but a 
small part of a rapidly changing global economic structure in which China is centrally 
involved, but for Africa this will likely prove to be highly significant.   
This paper is organized as follows: section 3 summarizes China-Africa trade and China’s 
investment in Africa. Section 4 discusses the broad orientation of China’s policy in 
Africa and sets out data on China’s aid to the continent and its effects on its economy. A 
more detailed analysis of China-Africa activity in energy and mineral resources is 
outlined in section 5. Textile and apparel trade is discussed in section 6. Some concluding 
remarks, including discussion of potential links to corrupt practices in China, are set out 
in section 7. 
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2. Sino-Africa Trade and Investment Flows 
China-Africa trade has increased sharply since 2000 when a formal China-Africa 
Cooperation Forum was initiated.
10 As figure 1 indicates, China’s bilateral trade with 
Africa grew from $10.6 billion in 2000 to $18 billion in 2003, $30 billion in 2004, $40 
billion in 2005, $55 billion in 2006, and $73 billion in 2007. About two-thirds of all 
African exports to China are oil and related products.
11 This trade is expected to grow to 
$100 billion by 2010. Figure 2 shows the rapidly growing share of China’s trade that 
Africa represents. China is now the continent's third most-important export market, 
behind the EU and the United States.
12 In 2005, for the first time, China became the 
largest individual country exporter for Sub-Saharan Africa with a market share of 7.7% 
and $13.4 billion in exports.
13 By 2010, the projections are for China to be Africa’s 
leading trading partner overall. 






1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Imports from Africa  Exports to Africa 
Source: MOFCOM &  
http://www.tralac.org/pdf/20070220_TheAfrican_TradingRelationship_with_China.pdf 
In large part, this growth reflects trade in energy and mineral products, but it also reflects 
China’s trade policies. In an effort to promote trade with the continent, China removed 
tariffs on 196 imports from 28 least developed Africa countries in 2005. While by the end 
of 2006, duty-free imports from Africa were put at $350 million, covering sesame, copper 
products, sheepskins, cocoa and other products, in July 2007, China expanded the 
coverage of African exports exempt from tariffs to 454 items. These included agricultural 
10 The China-Africa Forum on Cooperation was launched in October 2000 aimed to address globalization and enhanced 
cooperation between China and African countries utilizing bilateral social and economic development. “China-Africa 
Cooperation Forum: Past, Present and Future,” (2003) www.china.org.cn, Dec 11, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/China-Africa/82189.htm













   
 
                                                 
   
products, textiles and garments, wooden furniture, light industrial products, and 
mechanical and electric products. Currently, most African exports now receive duty-free 
access to China’s market. These policy initiatives have also helped expand African 
exports to China. 














Source: UNCTAD Handbook of statistics 2006-07, MOFCOM Statistics, Direction of Trade Statistics 
Yearbook 2006, IMF & http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07211.pdf & Broadman, 
Harry (2007) “Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier. Washington DC: The 
World Bank. 
Table 1 reports data on China’s top 10 African trading partners. Mineral resources have 
been as an especially important part of the growing trade. There is only limited African-
China trade in intermediate goods, apart from those used in textiles and agro business, 
and for now seemingly little incorporation of Sub-Saharan Africa into China coordinated 
global value chains. 
For Sub-Saharan Africa, the share of Africa’s total exports to China in five key 
commodities (oil, iron ore, logs, diamonds and cotton) increased to more than 80 percent 
in 2005, up from less than 50 percent in 1995. Available studies
14 suggest that between 
1998 and 2003 show that China may have accounted for most of the increase in global 
demand for basic minerals and metals: 99 percent for nickel, 96 percent for steel, 76 
percent for aluminum and 100 percent for copper. Indeed the continent’s exports to China 
increased more than 50 percent per annum as China’s demand for raw materials and oil 
increased sharply during this period. Similar growth rates apply for the period after 2003. 
As table 1 also shows, resource trade from Angola, Sudan, Algeria, Congo (Rep), 
Equatorial Guinea and South Africa accounts for the most part of China’s imports from 
Africa. China’s imports of manufactured products from Sub-Saharan Africa are also 
growing, but are geographically concentrated in Nigeria, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria 
and Egypt.
15 
14 Lennon, J (2004), Overview of Chinese Commodities, London: Macquarie Research Metals and Mining 





   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
 
   
 
 
   
 




   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
Table 1: China’s Top Ten African Trading Partners between 2004 and 2007 (US $) 










2007  37.03 bn  38.7  36.28 bn  26.1 
Africa  2006  26.69 bn  42.9  28.77 bn  36.4 
(Total)  2005 18.68  bn  35.3  21.1  bn  34.6 
2004  13.82 bn  35.7  15.64 bn  87.2 
2007  7.43 bn  28.8  6.61 bn  61.6 










2004  2.95 bn  45.5  2.96 bn  60.9 
2007  1.23  bn  37.6 12.89  bn 17.9 
Angola  2006 
2005 
894 m 




6.58  bn 
66.1 
39.5 
2004 194  m  32.7  4.72  bn  113.8 
2007  1.48 bn  5.0  4.13 bn  112.9 










2004 815  m  70.5  1.71  bn  18.3 
2007  3.79  bn 33.0 537  m 93.2 
Nigeria  2006 
2005 
2.85  bn 
2.30  bn 
23.9 
34.0 




2004 1.72  bn  -3.7  463  m  546.4 
2007 419  m  73.9  2.83  bn  1.4 
Congo (Rep)  2006 
2005 
241  m 
144  m 
67.4 
55.5 
2.79  bn 
2.28  bn 
22.4 
45.2 
2004 93  m  55.3  1.57  bn  92.6 
2007  4.36  bn 46.3 240  m 10.6 
Egypt  2006 
2005 
2.98  bn 
1.93  bn 
54.4 
39.3 




2004  1.39  bn 48.3 187  m 23.0 
2007  2.69 bn  37.9  1.14 bn  697.2 
Algeria  2006 
2005 
1.95  bn 
1.41  bn 
38.3 
43.3 




2004  980 m  51.8  259 m  161.1 
2007  2.16  bn 37.6 422  m 17.5 
Morocco  2006 
2005 
1.57  bn 







2004  943 m  35.6  214 m  33.0 
2007 93  m  126.8  1.70  bn  -33.1 
Equatorial  2006 41  m  115.8  2.54  bn  76.4 
Guinea  2005 19  m  85.7  1.44  bn  44.3 
2004  10 m  100.6  996 m  142.0 
2007 859  m  22.0  1.55  bn  -8.3 
Libya  2006 
2005 








2004  255 m  45.9  417 m  917.8 
Sources: Chinese Ministry of Commerce Statistics:  2004 China Trade Statistics, 2005 

















                                                 
   
    
 
 
Meanwhile, for seven Sub-Saharan African countries, China has become their largest 
trading partner in terms of total imports. Sudan, which in recent years has expanded 
energy trade with China, has the largest import share with China accounting for more that 
14 percent of its total imports. This is followed by Tanzania and Ghana with 9.1 percent, 
Nigeria with 7.1 percent, Kenya and Ethiopia with 6.4 percent and Uganda with 5.1 
percent.
16 The majority of these imports are manufactures. 
This rapid import growth is linked to recent stronger African growth performance. 
African Development Bank and IMF data both show that African economic growth rate 
reached 5.7 percent in 2006
17 and 6.2 percent in 2007
18, and is expected to reach 8 
percent in 2008
19. This faster African growth reflects strong demand for oil and mineral 
resources outside of Africa. 
But more FDI flowing into Africa and stronger agricultural performance have also 
contributed to this growth. Having received $2.2 billion worth of FDI from all sources 
during the 1980s, Africa currently attracts approximately $36 billion worth of FDI 
inflows.
20 FDI inflows to Africa from China, as figure 3 reports, were only $520 million 
in 2006, a small part of this total, but FDI into Africa from China has still dramatically 
increased during the years since 2003. 
Table 2 reports data on the stock of China’s FDI in Africa as of 2005 and compares the 
situation to 1990 reflecting the rapid growth. These Chinese FDI activities are seemingly 
different from those which are sourced from North America or the EU.  FDI from the 
developed world is delivered by privately-owned enterprises focusing on profits over a 
specified period of time, and involves minimal risk. China’s FDI on the sub-continent is 
more heavily undertaken by either partially or wholly state-owned enterprises. These 
have the objective of not simply making short term profits, but also forming long-lasting 
relationships with communities and governments. They are assisted in part by access to 
low-cost capital seemingly financed by low interest foreign exchange loans drawn for 
China’s reserves. Due to China’s increasing demands for resources to fuel high economic 
growth, a number of investments in Africa are linked to securing strategic reserves of 
mineral resources for Chinese industries.  
16 Jenkins, R. C. Edwards (2005), The Effect of China and India’s growth and Trade Liberalization on Poverty in 
Africa, Department of International Development, DCP 70, London: DFID 
17  http://xyf.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ckqita/200801/20080105360302.html 
18  http://xyf.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xgxz/200803/20080305440906.html 
19  http://xyf.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ckqita/200802/20080205387517.html 











     
 
Table 2: FDI stock in Africa Originating from China (Millions of dollars)   
Region/country 1990  2005 
Africa 49.2  1595.3 
North Africa  3.4  618.4 
Algeria 0.4  171.2 
Egypt 1.8  39.8 
Libya 1.0  33.1 
Morocco 0.2  20.6 
Sudan   351.5 
Tunisia   2.2 
Other Africa  45.9  976.9 
Angola   8.8 
Botswana   18.1 
Cameroon 0.5  7.9 
Cape Verde  0.6 
Central African Republic  1.2  2.0 
Chad 0.1  2.7 
Congo   13.3 
DRC   25.1 
Cote d’Ivoire  0.6  29.1 
Equatorial Guinea  16.6 
Ethiopia   29.8 
Gabon 2.9  35.4 
Gambia 0.5  1.2 
Ghana  7.3 
Guinea  44.2 
Kenya 0.5  58.3 
Liberia   15.9 
Madagascar 1.7  49.9 
Mali 0.0  13.3 
Mauritania   2.4 
Mauritius 6.3  26.8 
Mozambique 0.1  14.7 
Namibia   2.4 
Niger 0.1  20.4 
Nigeria 6.7  94.1 
Rwanda 2.9  4.7 
Senegal 0.2  2.4 
Seychelles   4.2 
Sierra Leone  1.1  18.4 
South Africa  112.3 
Togo 0.2  4.8 
Uganda  5.0 
Tanzania 1.7  62.0 
Zambia 3.2  160.3 
Zimbabwe 2.5  41.6 










   
   
 
 
                                                 
 
   
 
This FDI surge (admittedly from a small base) is in part a response to the Chinese 
government’s strategic call of “go out”. 
21  Chinese investors have established joint-
ventures with local investors across the continent in a number of sectors, particularly in 
oil, agriculture, agribusiness, textile and light manufacturing sectors. Chinese FDI in 
agriculture has been strongly supported by African governments given their commitment 
to food security. For the most part, these investments have helped raise GDP growth 
across Africa. Chinese investments have also provided a mechanism for assisting Chinese 
business to circumvent trade restrictions in the OECD against direct textile and apparel 
exports from China. These have helped to build local capacity, transfer technology and 
raise export levels for several African states. In Zimbabwe, for instance, for which 
tobacco has been among its top exports, Chinese investors have helped Zimbabwe 
process tobacco into cigarettes and export these as finished value-added products. 
Chinese investors and local company have also formed joint ventures to establish a large 
cement factory in Gweru to meet national demand.
22 








1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Source: MOFCOM & UNCTAD (2007), Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Towards a New 
Era of Cooperation among Developing Countries, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2001/1, 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?intDocItemID=13286&docid=8120&intItemID=1397 
&lang=1&mode=press & Broadman, Harry (2007) “Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New 
Economic Frontier. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
These Chinese investments can be found in a wide variety of sectors, including so-called 
fragile states and projects that western investors have seemingly deemed too risky. In 
Mozambique, for example, Chinese companies have recently invested in a large new 
shopping center and an industrial warehouse in the capital, Maputo. They have also 
financed a Soya processing plant, reportedly worth $10 million and in a facility 
21 The strategic call of “go out” was launched in Oct 2000.  Zhang, Jieying (2007) “Review on China FDI strategic 
system under the strategic call of ‘go out’,” Apr 2007, International Trade, 
http://www.itrade.org.cn/article.php?autoid=87&colum=%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E7%BB%8F%E8%B4%B8 



















                                                 
   
   
 
 
   
 
processing prawns worth an estimated $12 million.
23 In Zambia, China has invested 
nearly $160 million in the mining sector.
24 In the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), a country with prior civil conflicts and political instability, China has investments 
in cobalt and copper. In Sierra Leone, another country emerging from a devastating civil 
war, China is now developing a luxury hotel and making other investments – going 
where others would seemingly fear to tread.  In Uganda, a Chinese pharmaceutical firm is 
producing a new anti-malaria drug, and bidding on contracts to supply treated bed nets.
25 
Outside of the oil sector, the most significant investments by Chinese firms have been in 
infrastructural projects. For example, Chinese firms have been actively involved in the 
reconstruction of roads around Mozambique, where approximately two-thirds of the 
country’s 600 km of roads have been reconstructed by Chinese multinationals. On the 
border between Mozambique and Tanzania, Chinese firms have also won a tender to 
rebuild a large bridge carrying cross border trade between the two countries. They have 
also recently won tenders to repair water treatment plants in Beira and Quelimane 
reportedly worth $15 million and in Maputo worth more than $30 million.
26 In Zimbabwe, 
China is investing in minerals, roads and farming.  
Chinese enterprises have also bought a 70 percent stake in the Zimbabwe’s only 
electricity generation facilities at Hwange and Kariba,
27 and a significant stake in the 
national railway. In Zambia, Chinese investors are working on a $600 million 
hydroelectric plant at Kafue Gorge.
28 In Angola, 30 percent of a $2 billion soft loan 
offered by China has gone to finance the building of railroads, schools, roads, hospitals 
and bridges.
29 In the DRC, China has begun work on roads to facilitate mineral exports, 
and has evaluated potential future power projects as well.
30 
This growth of Chinese FDI (and primarily in resources, construction and infrastructure) 
reflects a Chinese decision at high level to contribute to South-South cooperation through 
mutually beneficial commercial relationships with the African continent. But at the same 
time, it also reflects commercial decisions made by individual Chinese enterprises. One 
claim supporting this is that Chinese enterprises have been successful in delivering 
comparable infrastructure projects at prices between 25 percent and 50 percent less than 
those other foreign investors charge.
31 
23 www.uk.cn/uploadfiles/2006428172021581.doc 
24 Leggett, Karby (2005) “Staking a Claim China Flexes Economic Muscle Throughout Burgeoning Africa,” Ethiopia 
Tecola Hagos, http://www.tecolahagos.com/staking_claim.htm 




28 Joshua Eisenman, Jushua and Jushua Kurlantzick (2006) “China’s Africa Strategy,” Current History, May 2006, pp. 
219-224, http://www.afpc.org/china-africa.shtml 
29 Thompson, Drew (2005) “China’s Emerging Interests in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa and the 
United States,” African Renaissance, Vol. 2, No. 4 (July/August 2005), at 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/press/0508_china_african_interests.pdf (September 19, 2005). 










   
 
   
 
 
                                                 
   
 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests a combination of factors that have allowed Chinese 
enterprises to both outbid and outperform Western counterparts across the continent in 
their investment activity. These include the use of cheaper Chinese materials; ample 
supply of Chinese labor which is often even less expensive than local labor and willing to 
live in isolated communities; access to subsidies provided by the Chinese Government to 
invest overseas and cheaper capital than local investors; as well as less pressure by the 
Chinese Government for state-owned companies to adhere to strict environmental and 
labor standards. 
Especially important in the growing FDI picture are infrastructure projects and 
development initiatives by Chinese state-owned companies across the continent, even in 
countries without abundant mineral resources. Some have been directly aid funded 
infrastructure projects assisting Africa governments. For example, in Guinea Bissau, 
China paid for the tiles and marbles of the parliamentary buildings. In East Africa, China 
provided financial support for, and assisted with the construction of new foreign ministry 
buildings and stadiums in both Djibouti and Uganda. All of these reflect the commitment 
by China to development and poverty alleviation programs for the continent.   
While it is worth emphasizing that FDI from China is still small relative to total flows 
into Africa, its growth is rapid. Importantly, this recent growth in Chinese presence in 
Africa coexists with relatively stagnant OECD inflows despite government attempts to 
promote it. For instance, the US has, in recent years, initiated a plan "promoting African 
economic growth and opportunity partnership" aimed at encouraging American 
companies to enter African markets.
32 But the aggregate impact has been small. European 
countries such as France have traditionally regarded Africa as their market due to 
colonial and linguistic ties as well as cultural factors. In 2006, European Union accounted 
for 32 percent of all Sub-Saharan exports, and its investment in Africa accounted for 36.6 
percent of total investments on the continent.
33 Data for the US were 29.6 percent and 37 
percent respectively.
34 Western states have maintained close relationships with Africa 
through language, information linkage and personnel exchanges, which assist in trade and 
finance and give Western countries substantial advantages. In comparison, Chinese 
enterprises have had to face disadvantages in language and culture differences. China’s 
ability to rapidly expand its share of African trade and finance is thus all the more 
remarkable. 
China’s red carpet treatment for 50 of Africa’s Heads of State in November 2006, which 
formally commemorated five decades of Sino-African relations, bears testimony to the 
continent’s current economic importance as seen from Beijing. High-profile state visits 




6~theSitePK:4607,00.html & 2007 World Investment Report, UNCTAD 
(http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2007p1_en.pdf)
34http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21052520~pagePK:64257043~piPK:43737 





















                                                 





Wen Jiabao to dozens of African states in recent months underscore its perceived 
importance. These visits occurred shortly after pledges to increase China’s aid to Africa 
from $2.3 billion in 2006 to $10 billion by 2009
35 (in comparison, U.S. aid to Africa is to 
reach $9 billion by 2010
36, and EU aid to Africa more than $20 billion depending on the 
next EU budget
37), and to further expand China’s trade and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) with the continent. 
35 http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0202/p06s01-woaf.html
36 Fletcher, Michael (2006), “Bush has quietly tripled aid to Africa,” Washington Post, Dec 31, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/30/AR2006123000941.html














                                                 
   
 
 
   
     
  
 
3. The objectives behind China’s Africa Policy  
A key element in understanding what is behind the growth in China’s involvement in 
Africa is the central Chinese precept that business should not be mixed with politics. 
China’s growing presence in Africa thus largely reflects commercial rather than other 
political considerations. To underscore the point, Chinese officials have repeatedly 
argued that attempts by other countries to link positions on democracy and human rights 
to economic integration violate the rights of sovereign countries. This position is 
reflected by in comments of China’s deputy foreign minister, Zhou Wenzhong: “Business 
is business. We try to separate politics from business…. You [the West] have tried to 
impose a market economy and multiparty democracy on these countries which are not 
ready for it. We are also against embargoes, which you have tried to use against us.”
38 
This is in contrast to a seemingly Western policy of linking aid to African recipients to 
Western values or specific development models for African countries. In the process, 
Western governments have often set meeting political indicators in areas such as 
democracy, freedom, openness, transparency, and human rights as criteria for aid.
39 In 
contrast, China has promoted what it calls the "Beijing consensus" 
40  in Africa by 
providing unconditional aid to African countries.  This reflects an underlying Chinese 
position of not interfering in other countries' internal affairs and respecting country rights 
to choose the road of development that best suits them. In its financial dealings with 
Africa, either through aid or FDI, China thus does not typically use links to policy to 
impose its own value system or development model on African economies.  
With Western aid increasingly tied to human rights and Western notions of economic 
reform, Africa has welcomed China’s unconditional aid approach. Thus, when the 
Angolan government hesitated over accepting an IMF loan linked to transparency in its 
oil revenue accounting, the Chinese Export-Import Bank offered an interest-free loan 
with no such accounting required.
41 China also similarly funded infrastructure projects 
such as railroad, schools, roads, hospitals and bridges as well as laying a fiber-optic 
network.in Angola. In these cases, the wider Chinese interest was perceived to lie in 
developing country to country relationships in the anticipation that resource project 
approvals would follow. One could claim that narrower self interest still prevailed, but it 
remains the case that such aid was untied; it promoted development, and had not been 
forthcoming from much wealthier OECD countries.    
38 French, Howard (2004) “China in Africa: All Trade and No Political Baggage,” New York Times, August 8, 2004. 
39 Zhang, Chun (2006) “’Neocolonialism’ label can not be pinned on China,” Shanghai Research Center for
International Issues, Nov 02, http://www.sinofile.net/saiweng/sip_blog.nsf/d6plinks/YZHI-6VB8J3
40 The "Beijing Consensus" was brought forward spontaneously by international opinions against the background of
China's fast economic development since the reform and opening up and considerable raise in people's living standard, 
while "Washington Consensus" was put forward deliberately and systematically. Participants of the "Washington 
Consensus" reached their consensus on the basis of actual acceptance of Neo-liberalism. “The ‘Washington Consensus’ 
and ‘Beijing Consensus’,” People’s Daily Online, Jun 18, 2005, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/18/eng20050618_190947.html 












                                                 





Equally, when the UN Security Council proposed sanctions against Sudan because of the 
Darfur situation, Beijing insisted on their position set out above, namely “the internal 
situation in the Sudan is an internal affair, and China is not in a position to impose upon 
Khartoum.”
42 China then provided assistance in other ways. To help Sudan develop its oil 
industry, PetroChina invested $2.7 billion in Sudan, built a 1506km oil pipeline, a crude 
processing plant with an annual capacity of 2.5m tons, and several gas stations.
43 This not 
only changed Sudan from an oil importing to an oil exporting country, but also ensured 
Sudan had an integrated oil industry structure covering exploration, production, refining 
and transport for sales. In addition, China subsequently invested over $20 million to help 
the Sudan build other facilities, including schools and hospitals.
44 This  unconditional 
investment and aid has flowed quickly into Sudan since China adopted a policy of non 
involvement in Sudan’s domestic affairs. But China’s principle of not interfering in other 
countries' internal affairs through conditional aid or FDI has not restrained China from 
pursuing humanitarian concerns in Africa. For example, in 2004, China contributed 1,500 
peacekeepers to UN missions across Africa, such as in Liberia.  
Along with growing Chinese trade and foreign direct investment in Africa, Chinese aid to 
Africa has also grown correspondingly. China began to provide official development 
assistance and debt relief from the mid 1950s on.  From 1956 to May 2006, it contributed 
a total of $5.7 billion
45 for more than 800 aid projects.
46 Meanwhile, the value of Chinese 
aid in Africa reportedly reached $2.3 billion in 2006.  More recently, China has aimed to 
keep to its long-standing commitments made to the continent in the early 1990s, by 
providing financial assistance and facilitating the forgiveness of loans. More recently, the 
third summit of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation, held from 3 to 5 November 
2006, took a number of steps in this direction. China pledged to double its 2006 aid flows 
to Africa by 2009. China also cancelled all debt stemming from Chinese interest-free 
government loans that matured at the end of 2005, estimated to have reached 
approximately $1.4 billion, for the 31 highly indebted and least developed countries 
(LDCs) on the continent which had diplomatic relations with Beijing.  
China also provided $3 billion in preferential loans and $2 billion in preferential buyer’s 
credit to African states, and offered zero-tariff treatment for various exports to China 
from 30 of the least developed African countries. In order to further promote China’s FDI 
in Africa and bilateral trade, a China-Africa development fund of $5 billion was set up by 
the Chinese government to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa and provide 
support to them. In the meantime, China further opened its market to Africa, increasing 
from 190 to over 440 the number of export items to Beijing receiving zero-tariff 
treatment from the African LDCs.
47 
42 French, “China in Africa: All Trade, with No Political Baggage,” p. A12. 
43 Zhang, Chun (2006) “’Neocolonialism’ label can not be pinned on China,” Shanghai Research Center for
International Issues, Nov 02, http://www.sinofile.net/saiweng/sip_blog.nsf/d6plinks/YZHI-6VB8J3
44 He, WenPing (2006), “Partners in Development,” Beijing Review, Vol. 44,  
http://www.bjreview.cn/EN/06-44-e/sp-1.htm 
45 This stock figure may not be consistent with aid flows discussed throughout this paper. 
46 He, Wenping, 2006, “China-Africa Relations Moving into an Era of Rapid Development,” in: Africa Institute of 
South Africa, Inside AISA, Oct/Dec., pp.3-6. 

















                                                 






There has also been further assistance beyond direct financial flows. In Liberia, as well as 
in Mozambique
48, China has signed a memo, canceling all debts owing to it by these 
states – which jointly amounted to more than $35 million.
49 In Liberia’s case, Beijing 
specially introduced a tariff exemption policy for all imports from Liberia. 
Another element in this picture is China’s participation in the African Development Bank. 
China joined both the African Development Bank Group's (AfDB)
50 and the African 
Development Fund in 1985. Currently, China has 24,230 shares, or a 1.117 percent stake 
in the AfDB. Since joining, China has donated $314 million to the African Development 
Fund, supporting infrastructure construction, and poverty alleviation as well as 
educational projects in Africa. To further develop cooperation between China and the 
AfDB, Beijing signed a $2 million technical cooperation agreement in 1996. This 
agreement provides subsidies for Chinese experts who work on projects and bring 
advanced technology to Africa. So far, the Chinese government has paid $900,000 to 
support 14 projects in eight African countries.
51 
Chinese development assistance has also taken a variety of forms in Africa. Engineering, 
medical and agricultural teams have provided technical support to African states since the 
1960s, although this accelerated by the late 1980s. China trained over 14,600 people in 
different fields for Africa.
52 In both Liberia and the Central African Republic, China has 
directly provided funding for training programs to strengthen the capacity of the civil 
service in these countries. In areas of small-scale agricultural production and hydro-
irrigation, China has supported training programs that have involved thousands of 
African farmers across the continent.
53 In Djibouti, Ethiopia and elsewhere in the Horn of 
Africa, Beijing has in recent years supplied modern telecommunication equipment, along 
with training programs designed to help locals entrepreneurs maintain their equipment.
54 
During the 2006 Beijing Summit, China pledged to train 15,000 African professionals, 
send 100 senior agricultural experts to Africa, and set up 10 special agricultural 
technology demonstration centers across the continent over the by 2009. Additionally, the 
number of Chinese government scholarships to African students is planned to double 
from 2,000 per year in 2006 to 4,000 per year by 2009.
55 
China’s aid has also financed building schools and clinics treating patients suffering from 
HIV/AIDS. China has thus far sent medical teams to 43 African countries, amounting to 
48 http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim335.html#story7 
49 http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0209/p01s04-woaf.htm 
50 The African Development Bank Group's (AfDB) is the main development finance institution in Africa and was 
established in 1964. It has 77 members, 53 from Africa and 24 outside the continent. The bank's priorities include the 
reduction of poverty, improving the living conditions of African populations and resource mobilization for the 
economic and social progress of its regional member countries. 
51 Zhang, Lu (2007) “Gathering to boost Sino-African ties,” China Daily, May 14, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/adb/210662.htm
52 Zhang, Chun (2006) “’Neocolonialism’ label can not be pinned on China,” Shanghai Research Center for 
International Issues, Nov 02, http://www.sinofile.net/saiweng/sip_blog.nsf/d6plinks/YZHI-6VB8J3
53 http://panafricannews.blogspot.com/2006_10_01_archive.html 
54 http://www.bjreview.com.cn/expert/txt/2006-12/15/content_50879.htm 
55 Chee, Yoke Ling, (2006) “China: Doubles aid and investment to Africa,” Third World Network, Nov 5, 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/finance/twninfofinance010.htm 
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more than 16,000 person/visits, and helped treat 240 million patients,
56 including 180 
million cases of HIV/AIDS.
57 Today more than 900 Chinese doctors work in Africa.
58 
Furthermore, during November 2006’s Beijing Summit, China’s leadership announced 
the dispatching of more than 300 volunteers to Africa, RMB300 million for artemisinin 
(an anti-malaria drug) and 30 malaria prevention and treatment centers, and pledged to 
build more than 100 schools and 30 hospitals across the continent by 2009. 
59 
At the same time, China’s success in securing mineral rights in Africa has gone hand in 
hand with support for a wide range of construction projects and financial assistance. In 
Sudan, for instance, Beijing used its technical expertise and links to other government 
owned companies to help the country’s oil industry become a major export earner. It also 
invested some $2 billion in the country’s Merowe hydropower dam, due to open in 2008, 
which is expected to provide for all of the country’s energy needs for the next two 
decades.
60 China's Sino Hydro Corporation has helped Ghana build a 400 megawatt 
hydroelectric dam worth $600 million in the north of the country.
61 Beijing also helped 
build a $300 million dam project for Ethiopia.
62 In Rwanda, Chinese companies have 
paved more than 80 percent of the main roads.
63 In late 2006, China agreed a $2 billion 
credit line to help fund infrastructure projects in Equatorial Guinea.
 64 
Debt forgiveness and aid from China have also contributed to infrastructure development 
in African countries, which in turn has been key for political stability. Particularly 
important have been China’s programs in education and health in Africa, which are 
recognized as central to African growth, and have improved local living standards. These 
infrastructure improvements have also helped African countries secure other loans and 
investment opportunities, contributing to further development. “South-South 
cooperation” has thus been centrally embodied in China’s aid activity in Africa, which in 
turn has been welcomed by a large number of African governments.     
56 Zhang, Chun (2006) “’Neocolonialism’ label can not be pinned on China,” Shanghai Research Center for 
International Issues, Nov 02, http://www.sinofile.net/saiweng/sip_blog.nsf/d6plinks/YZHI-6VB8J3 
57 Thompson, Drew (2005) “China’s Soft Power in Africa: From the ‘Beijing Consensus’ to Health Diplomacy,” 
Jamestown Foundation China Brief, Vol. 5, No. 21, Oct 13 
58 Lyman, Princeton (2005) “China’s Rising Role in Africa,”  presented to the US-China Commission on July 21, 2005, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8436/
59 Chee, Yoke Ling, (2006) “China: Doubles aid and investment to Africa,” Third World Network, Nov 5, 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/finance/twninfofinance010.htm
60 http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/cb_007_007a.pdf 
61 “Africa: Western Leaders Monitor China-Africa Summit” (2007), www.allAfrica.com, May 17, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200705161110.html 
62 Joshua Eisenman, Jushua and Jushua Kurlantzick (2006) “China’s Africa Strategy,” Current History, May 2006, pp. 
219-224, http://www.afpc.org/china-africa.shtml 
63 Leggett, Karby (2005) “Staking a Claim China Flexes Economic Muscle Throughout Burgeoning Africa,” Ethiopia 
Tecola Hagos, http://www.tecolahagos.com/staking_claim.htm 












            
              




   
 
   
4. Resources and China’s Involvement in Africa 
A key factor underlying China’s recent rapid expansion in Africa is Beijing’s desire to 
gain secure access to supplies of oil, gas and key minerals. The Chinese leadership has 
always emphasized that China’s continued high growth will require a growing supply of 
raw materials, especially oil. The country’s growing energy demands, coupled with 
relatively stagnant coal output
65 and falling domestic crude oil production
66, prompted the 
country to look overseas for stable sources of mineral resources from the early 1990s. In 
1993, a turning point for China came when it changed from a net exporter to a net 
importer of oil. 
By late 2004 China had become the world’s second largest oil user consuming 5.5 
million barrels a day (bbl/d), more than Japan’s 5.4 million bbl/d, and placing it behind 
only the US at 19.7 million bbl/d.
67 Currently, China’s oil consumption is put at 7 million 
barrels a day while the U.S. consumes about 20 million barrels.
68 China’s oil and gas 
imports are projected to increase to 60 percent of its total oil and gas demand by 2020 
from the current level of 33 percent,
69 while its oil consumption is expected to increase 
by 10 percent per annum
70. Approximately 40 percent of the increase in global oil 
demand between 2000 and 2004 and 2002 to 2006 is attributed to China’s rapid growth in 
demand.
71  China’s oil imports from Asia’s oil producing states are not sufficient to meet 
either its current or projected energy demands and Chinese officials seemingly believe 
there are limits to Middle East oil and gas production, especially given its current primary 
allocation to Europe and the US. 
Figure 4: China’s growing gap between oil demand and domestic production (mb/d) 
Source: International Energy Agency, 2002, p.53 
65 http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/AsianEnergySecurity_MainStudy.pdf 
66 http://www.pnl.gov/aisu/pubs/engenvup.pdf 
67 US Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency: Country Analysis Brief: China, Sept 15, 2005, and Downs, 
Erica: “The Chinese Energy Security Debate”, China Quarterly, No. 1777, Mar 2004, pp.21 - 41. 
68 Shinn, David H. (2007) “Africa, China, the United States, and Oil,” May 8, http://forums.csis.org/africa/?p=34 
69 Goodman, Peter (2004) “China Invests Heavily in Sudan’s Oil Industry” The Washington Post, Dec 23
















                                                 
 
       
     
     
     
     
   
   
   
     
   
 
As a late entrant to the global oil market, Africa represents perhaps the last major source 
of oil reserves which is not primarily managed by major Western energy companies, and 
hence available for Chinese corporations to invest in and ultimately partly control. 
Libya’s 39 billion barrels of oil reserves and Nigeria’s 36 billion barrels are twice the size 
of China’s proven reserves. Africa has only 9 percent of the world’s proven petroleum 
reserves compared to almost 62 percent for the Middle East. IHS Energy, an oil and gas 
consulting firm, believes that Africa will provide 30 percent of the world’s growth in 
hydrocarbon production by 2010.  A U.S. Department of Energy study projected that 
African oil production would rise 91 percent between 2002 and 2025. African oil tends to 
be high quality and low in sulfur, making it particularly desirable to refiners. Africa 
currently supplies almost one third of China’s oil imports.
72 
In recent years, Chinese state-owned enterprises have not only invested heavily in foreign 
oil reserves and but have also used Chinese construction and engineering to assist African 
oil producing exporters such as Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Angola, Sudan, Gabon and Algeria 
in further developing their oil, gas and other mineral resources.  In 2005, China imported 
more than 38 million tones of crude oil from Africa, about one-third of China's oil 
imports
73, and this reflects major investments in oil and gas projects in countries such as 
Nigeria, Sudan, Gabon and Angola. 
Table 3: Resource exports to China in 2005 in (percentage of total trade) 





Gabon 54.8  42.3 
DRC  99.6 
Ghana  59.8 
South Africa  45.6 
Cameroon   39.7 
Tanzania  23.4  53.8 
Source: OECD Development Center, 2006 
Table 3 indicates that oil, minerals and other natural resources account for the major part 
of Africa’s exports to China. Currently, all exports of Angola to China are oil. Exports of 
Sudan, Nigeria and Congo (DRC) are also all largely oil. The huge reserves of minerals 
in DRC imply that its exports are mainly metals. Gabon, Cameroon and Tanzania are 
72 Shinn, David H. (2007) “Africa, China, the United States, and Oil,” Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) Africa Policy Forum, May 8 















   






abundant in timber which is imported by China. Agricultural products, such as cotton, 
also play an important role in Tanzania’s exports to China. In 2006, oil and gas accounted 
for 62 percent of Africa’s exports to China, followed by non-petroleum minerals and 
metals with 13 percent. China’s high demand for oil, minerals and other natural resources 
is thus motivating active engagement in investment in these sectors and strengthening 
economic cooperation with Africa.  
By country, the following situations apply: 
Nigeria 
As a member of OPEC, Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the eleventh-
largest producer in the world. Nigeria is a major oil supplier to both Western Europe and 
the US, producing roughly 2.5 million barrels per day. Nigeria's proven oil reserves are 
approximately 35.2 billion barrels, and there are plans by the Nigerian government to 
expand this to 40 billion barrels by 2010. In July 2005, PetroChina finalized a deal 
reported to be worth $800 million with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to 
purchase approximately 30,000 barrels of oil per day for five years.
74 In January 2006, 
the Chinese state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) acquired a 
45 percent stake in a Nigerian offshore oil and gas field reported to be worth more than 
$2.27 billion. The company subsequently promised to additionally invest up to $2.25 
billion in field development.
75 In addition, China has won a license to operate four of 
Nigeria’s oil blocs as part of wider package involving a commitment to build a hydro 
power station. China is currently reported to be considering $7 billion in investments in 
Nigeria, covering a wide variety of sectors.
76 
Angola 
Angola is the second-largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria with oil 
production expected to reach 2 million barrels per day by 2008. Angola also has major 
offshore sources of gas. China has invested heavily in Angola given its relative current 
political stability.
77 In March 2004, China granted Angola a $2 billion soft loan as part of 
a longer term aid package in exchange for a contract to supply 10,000 barrels of crude oil 
per day.
78 Under the agreement, the proceeds of the loan will be heavily invested in 
infrastructure construction, with 70 percent of funds earmarked for Chinese companies 
and the remaining 30 percent going to local subcontractors, including funds for Chinese 
74 “China, Nigeria Sign Oil Supply Pact” (2005), Xinhua News Agency, July 9. 
75 “Linebaugh, Kate and Shai Oster (2006) “CNOOC Pays $2.27 Billion for Nigerian Oil Gas Stake,” The Wall Street 
Journal, Jan 10. 
76 Onyebuchi Ezigbo (2005) “Nigeria-China Sign $800 million Crude Oil Sale Agreement,” This Day (Lagos), July 11, 
on the web at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200507111391.html.   Dianna Games (2005) “Chinese the New 
Imperialists in Africa, Business Day Johannesburg) February 21, on  the web at 
http://allafraca.com/stories/printable/200502210104.html
77 Shinn, David H. (2007) “Africa, China, the United States, and Oil,” Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) Africa Policy Forum, May 8 
78 Lee, Don (2004) “China Barrels Ahead in Oil Market,” The Los Angles Times, November 14, 2004, at 
























   





   
 
 
   
 
companies to build railroads, schools, roads, hospitals, bridges, and offices; lay a fiber-
optic network; and train Angolan telecommunications workers.
79 According to the World 
Bank, Angola accounted for half of China’s oil imports from Africa in 2005, and 
exported 25 percent of its oil production to China.
80 
Sudan 
Sudan has proven reserves of some 563 million barrels of oil. Since 1999, Chinese 
enterprises have invested more than $3 billion in pipeline construction and in refineries.
81 
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) entered Sudan in 1996 and now is 
the single largest shareholder in a major project with a 40 percent share
82 of $1.7 billion 
in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, which is Sudan’s largest petroleum 
company and controls Sudan’s oil fields. CNPC’s operation, which also discovered 
additional oil in Sudan, produced 500,000 barrels per day in 2006 and was expected to 
reach 750,000 barrels per day in 2007.
83 In addition, China has recently signed new 
partnership agreements to extract oil from the Melut Basin and Darfur.
84 China now takes 




China is now the world’s largest consumer of copper, followed by the United States.
86 
Zambia-CRC hold the largest copper deposit in the world. In 2004, proven copper 
reserves in the southern African states were put at  2 billion tons. In 2005, the China Non-
Ferrous Metals Corporation in Africa (NFCA) invested $160 million
87 in the Chambishi 
Copper Mine, one of Zambia’s largest copper mines, and holds an 85 percent stake.
88 
Besides copper, Zambia’s mineral resources spans a range of metals, particularly gold, 
gemstones, a variety of industrial minerals and potential energy resources - uranium, coal 
79 Thompson, Drew (2005) “China’s Emerging Interests in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa and the 
United States,” African Renaissance, Vol. 2, No. 4 (July/August 2005), at 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/press/0508_china_african_interests.pdf (September 19, 2005). 
80 Broadman, Harry G. (2006), Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21056305~pagePK:146 
736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644,00.html
81 Brookes, Peter and Ji Hye Shin (2006) “China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States,” 
Backgrounder #1916, Feb 22, at http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg1916.cfm 
82 The other partners in the joint venture of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company include Talisman Energy of 
Canada, the Sudanese Government and Petronas of Malaysia.  Goodman, Peter (2004) `China Invests Heavily in 
Sudan’s Oil Industry’ The Washington Post, December 23
83 Shinn, David H. (2007) “Africa, China, the United States, and Oil,” Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) Africa Policy Forum, May 8 
84 http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Africa_Task_Force_Web.pdf 
85 Blair, David (2005) “Oil-Hungry China Takes Sudan under Its Wing,” The Telegraph, Apr 23
86 
“China Scoops Up Minerals, Infrastructure Contracts,” SouthScan (London), June 30, 2005. Posted to the web July 6, 
2005, http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200507060674.html 
87 Leggett, Karby (2005) “Staking a Claim China Flexes Economic Muscle Throughout Burgeoning Africa,” Ethiopia 
Tecola Hagos, http://www.tecolahagos.com/staking_claim.htm 


















                                                 
   
   
 
   
   
   
and hydrocarbons. Chinese companies have also invested in coal and gemstone mining. 
China has also begun to invest in copper and cobalt mines in the neighboring DRC.  
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe has large gold reserves and is home to the world's second-largest platinum 
mines. Zimbabwe together with South Africa constitutes China’s major source of 
platinum and iron ore.
89 In addition, China is Zimbabwe’s largest importer of tobacco, 
one of the country’s major exports. China has made large investments in Zimbabwe’s 
tobacco production and processing, and the agriculture industry. In September 2006, 
China announced a $200 million capital injection in Zimbabwe’s farming, manufacturing 
and mining.
90 The largest deal announced was the $1.3 billion agreement in 2006 with 
China Machine-Building International Corporation to mine coal and build thermal-power 
generators in Zimbabwe aimed to reduce the country’s electricity shortage.
91 
Gabon 
Gabon has proven oil reserves of roughly 2.5 billion barrels. The China National 
Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC) plans to explore both onshore and offshore in 
Gabon.
92 A Chinese consortium also recently signed a $3 billion iron ore deal in Gabon, 




South Africa has large reserves of several minerals, including diamonds. Mineral 
products are the major exports from South Africa to China, accounting for 65.3 percent 
of South Africa's exports to China in 2005. In 2006, China imported $1.47 billion worth 
of mineral products and $1.19 billion worth of diamonds, with growth rates of 41.3 
percent and 24 percent from 2005.
94 
Liberia and West Africa 
China and Liberia have signed a preliminary deal to allow China's second-largest state oil 
and gas firm, Sinopec Group, to explore for oil and gas in the West African state.
95 In 
89 Brookes, Peter and Ji Hye Shin (2006) “China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States,” 
Backgrounder #1916, Feb 22, at http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg1916.cfm 
90 “Zimbabwe eager to strengthen economic ties with China,” (2006) People’s Daily online, Sept 28, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200609/28/eng20060928_307027.html
91 “China Undates,” (2006) Mines and Communites, Jun 16, 
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press1109.htm 
92 Brookes, Peter and Ji Hye Shin (2006) “China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States,” 
Backgrounder #1916, Feb 22, at http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg1916.cfm 
93 “Africa: Western Leaders Monitor China-Africa Summit” (2007), The Nation (Nairobi), May 17, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200705161110.html 
94 “China—South African Supplement: Open to Trade,” (2007), Beijing Review 








   
 
 
   












addition, a small West African country, Equatorial Guinea, has proven oil reserves 
estimated at 1.28 billion barrels. Although Equatorial Guinea has attracted less 
investment from China in oil sector than Angola and Sudan, it is still an important 
supplier of crude. Since 1999, Equatorial Guinea has been China’s third largest African 
supplier. In 2006, its oil exports to China exceeded $2.5 billion.
96 Chinese companies are 
expected to bid for oil blocs in the 2007 licensing round.
97 Chinese companies also run a 
major timber operation in this country.
98 The Republic of Congo, Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
fifth largest oil producer, also has 1.5 billion barrels in proven reserves. They may 
become potential oil exporters and Chinese investment has also begun here. China has 
also begun to invest in cobalt and copper mines in the Republic of Congo.    
China’s emphasis on securing reliable sources of minerals in Africa for its own economy 
is also reflected in its approach to vertical integration and ownership of oil production 
facilities through to transportation tankers. As a means of securing oil for Chinese 
consumers below international market prices, instead of buying rights for future 
exploration and development, Chinese enterprises have concentrated on purchasing 
equity shares in established oil fields. With a vision of turning themselves into global 
players in the energy market, Chinese oil companies in Africa, such as the China National 
Petroleum Corporation, have sought to secure equity positions which will enhance their 
ability to learn industrial practices, minimize risks and allow for technology transfer. This 
strategic judgment thus also partly explains China’s long-term vision with regard to its 
engagement with Africa. Chinese enterprises thus have plans to be involved with the 
development of oil reserves in Africa for the long haul.  
While China’s position in oil in Africa is growing, it is nonetheless worth emphasizing 
that Western companies remain the largest consumers of Africa’s oil and related products. 
Currently, over 18 percent of U.S. crude oil imports are sourced from Africa,
99 and by 
2015 this is projected to increase to 25 percent.
100 Of U.S. oil imports from Africa, 
Nigeria accounts for 47 percent, and Algeria and Angola provide 19 percent each.
101 In 
2003 alone, US companies invested $10 billion in African oil.
102 The American oil 
company Chevron Texaco invested over $5 billion during 1998-2003 in its African 
projects,
103 and planned to spend another $20 billion in Africa over the following five 
96 Shinn, David H. (2007) “Africa, China, the United States, and Oil,” Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) Africa Policy Forum, May 8 
97 Country Profiles Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK 
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104 It owns a 40 percent stake in the joint venture Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL) 
with NNPC which is the second largest oil producer in Nigeria and produces 
approximately 400,000 barrels per day.
105 Another American oil company Exxon-Mobil 
laid a $3.7-billion 670-mile oil pipeline from Chad to the Atlantic coast in Cameroon,
106 
and also holds 40 percent shares of Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited with a yield of 
around 900,000 barrels per day.
107  Exxon alone invested nearly US$10 billion in three 
deep-sea oil exploitation projects in Angola in 2000.
108 The French oil company Total, 
one of the world’s top four oil companies, plans to invest $10 billion in Nigeria and $5 
billion in Angola during the next five years for oil exploration.
109 British/Dutch Shell 
owns 55 percent of the 30 billion barrels of oil reserves in Nigeria (since 2002), and 40 
percent of the 2.2 million barrels of daily output in Nigeria.
110 In comparison, China's oil 
exploration and operations in Africa remain small. Currently, China's oil imports from 
Africa are less than one third of US oil imports from the continent.
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While Sino-African oil trade is developing rapidly due to the Chinese focus on partnering 
in infrastructure development, it is often viewed by Africans as more mutually beneficial 
than trade with OECD countries. For instance, at the end of 2003, PetroChina had 
invested $2.7 billion in Sudan, built 1506km in oil pipeline, a crude processing plant with 
an annual capacity of 2.5m tons, and several gas stations. This ensured that Sudan has a 
complete oil industry system from exploration, production, refining and transport to sales. 
In addition, China invested over $20 million to help the Sudan build other facilities 
including schools and hospitals. In comparison, Western companies have explored for oil 
for over 50 years in Nigeria. However, the country continues to import gasoline, and it 
does not have its own oil production and processing system. Western oil companies are 
also believed to pay less attention to infrastructure investment. China's energy policy in 
Africa is thus seen, for now, by both parties as being more fully implemented in ways 
which yield mutual benefits. 
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5. Textile and Apparel Investments 
A further element in the growth of China’s trade and investment in Africa has been the 
continued use of African operations to in circumvent new trade restrictions specifically 
targeted against China following the removal of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) in 
2005. The situation is complex since immediately following the termination of the MFA, 
some of the quota hopping foreign investment induced to enter Africa to avoid trade 
restrictions on apparel imports in the OECD from China was induced to return to China. 
It has been the subsequent new restrictions against China (see Dayaratna-Banda and 
Whalley (2007)) under China’s WTO accession terms that have induced new investment 
flows. 
The Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) was originally set up by European Union (EU), 
Canada and the US in 1974 to protect their clothing and textile industries from more 
efficient producers in Asia by capping the amount any country could export to them. 
Under successive MFAs, country and product coverage expanded as more developing-
country exporters became involved and more categories of textiles and clothing were 
progressively added to the agreements. China’s exports of clothing and textiles to OECD 
countries were highly restricted by MFA quotas before the removal of the MFA at the 
end of 2004. During the MFA implementation period, quota utilization rates in OECD 
countries for Chinese imports for the MFA category were extremely high, and some of 
them were nearly 100%.  
One of the further effects of the MFA has been its generation of quota-hopping foreign 
investment (Whalley, 2006). In order to circumvent trade restrictions under the MFA, 
some Chinese clothing and textile firms moved production away from their newly quota-
restrained homes to temporarily unconstrained countries. One of the areas especially 
suitable for quota-hopping foreign investment was Sub-Saharan Africa.     
Africa’s textile and apparel sector also benefited from the US Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) in May 2000 that allowed textile exports of 38 eligible African 
countries with tariff and quota exemptions if they meet certain rules. Those included a 
restriction that the product’s raw materials originate either in the exporting country or in 
the US. But African countries categorized as least developed
112 were exempt from this 
additional requirement. Their products are allowed duty-free access into the US market 
under the condition that the final assembly of the textile products takes place in the 
exporting country, no matter where the yarn spinning, fabric weaving or knitting occurs. 
This opening in the U.S. clothing market created a ready market for AGOA countries. 
These advantages for those African textile-exporting countries of less constrained quotas 
and preferential market access into the EU and the US attracted investments from many 
Chinese companies. By way of example, textiles and clothing became Lesotho’s 
economic mainstay, which at one point employed 56,000 workers — accounting for 
virtually every manufacturing job in the country. Between 1999 and 2001, US imports 
from Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius and South Africa increased by 66 percent. 










                                                 
 
From 2001 to 2004, the average increase of Lesotho exports to the U.S. was over 85 
percent. In 2003, Africa exported $1.2 billion of clothing and textiles to the US, a 50 
percent increase from the previous year. The market share of sub-Saharan Africa in the 
U.S. textiles market increased between 2002 and 2004. China has been credited with 
promoting Africa exports in both textiles and clothing in this process.  
The MFA termination in Jan 2005 brought sharp product specific increases in China’s 
exports to the U.S. and the EU in the initial 4 month period (January –April 2005). While 
the aggregate exports of clothing and textiles surged substantially to both the U.S. and the 
EU in this period, the largest percentage and absolute surges came from China. And these 
increases were accompanied by the fall in the market share of non Asian suppliers, 
including sub-Saharan Africa. During the first quarter of 2005, textile and apparel exports 
from Africa to the U.S. fell to $270 million from $370 million during the same period the 
year before, and the market share of sub-Saharan Africa in the U.S. textiles market 
dropped in the year of 2005. 
Although the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC)
113 ended the MFA and aimed to 
eliminate quotas and increase developing countries’ access to the previously protected 
markets of developed countries, it also allowed developed countries to apply special 
safeguard measures under certain conditions by introducing new trade restrictions if their 
domestic industries were believed to be threatened by the liberalized imports. Such new 
restrictions were also facilitated by China’s WTO accession terms. As a result, after 
substantial increases in China’s textile and clothing exports to the U.S. and the EU in the 
first quarter of 2005, a series of new restraints on textile and apparel exports against 
China successively appeared. These new restraints have been termed the China 
Containment Agreements (CCAs) by Dayaratna-Banda & Whalley (2007). In accordance 
with the terms of China’s WTO accession protocol, a special safeguard mechanism 
similar to MFA aiming at preventing a surge of China’s exports remains in effect until 
Dec 31, 2008. In addition, product-specific safeguards which allowed for restrictions to 
prevent market disruption caused by any specific products, as well as anti-dumping 
measures were also used by developed countries to contain Chinese textile and apparel 
exports. 
By late summer of 2005, the U.S. made use of China’s WTO accession protocol to force 
China to accept new growth rate quotas. The new agreement re-imposed quotas on 34 
product categories and major import products (shirts, trousers and underwear) are all 
covered by the new restrictions. The EU followed and then reached a similar agreement 
with China in the early autumn of 2005. Effectively, the CCAs have placed China’s 
textile and clothing sector in a similar situation to the old MFA era. 
Although these post MFA quotas are generally higher than the older MFA quotas and 
covered fewer categories, they were effective in significantly slowing further export 
growth by China. In 2005, aggregate imports of textiles and clothing by both the U.S. and 
the EU increased at modest rates (6 percent for U.S. clothing imports, 1 percent for U.S. 


























textiles imports, 6 percent for EU clothing and textiles imports). Due to the CCAs, 
Chinese export growth under the imposition of new restrictions fell from that of the 
immediate post MFA period of 2005. In total, over 12 months on from January 2005, 
China’s textile and clothing exports increased, but only at a modest rate of 8 percent for 
the U.S. and 7 percent for the EU (Whalley, 2006). 
The impacts of the CCAs on China’s FDI investment parallel those of the MFA. The 
large volume and share surges into the U.S. and the EU markets in 2005 have been much 
reduced in percentage terms in 2006 (Dayaratna-Banda & Whalley, 2007). China’s textile 
and clothing exports to the U.S. rose slightly in 2006. This was due in large part to the 
surges in products not covered by the agreements. China’s share in the U.S. markets in 
restricted categories remained at 25 percent in value terms and 28 percent in volume 
terms in 2006, and even several key restricted categories of products show negative 
growth in 2006, but shares in unrestricted categories of products rose substantially from 
26 percent in 2005 to 46 percent in 2006. Although overall EU apparel imports rose in 
2006, EU imports from China in knitted clothing categories declined by 2 percent in 2006 
compared to an increase by 53.76 in 2005. In woven clothing categories, EU imports 
from China rose only by 4.69 percent in 2006 compared to 39.32 percent increase in 2005. 
Chinese quota in the EU in 2006 was nearly fully used by mid-summer. In contrast, other 
Asian countries’ exports rose considerably in this period. These show that China’s 
exports have suffered in the U.S. and EU markets in 2006 due to CCAs. 
Therefore, most of the responses to the MFA, including quota-hopping foreign 
investment, are still presented under the CCAs. So far, AGOA countries still hold a 
significant advantage in sectors where duty-free exports to the US are allowed since 
average US tariffs amount to 17 percent of the landed value of products, with cotton 
products averaging 13 percent and synthetics 25 percent for non-AGOA countries. In 
order to circumvent the quota limitation under CCAs, Chinese firms have kept using 




























6. Other considerations and concluding remarks 
China's rapid growth and now its growing presence in Africa is the main focus of this 
paper. In the text, we document its content, coverage and speed of change. Africa has 
clearly gained, and most likely significantly from this interaction with China. And 
somewhat paradoxically, China with GDP per capita of perhaps US$1,800 (rather than 
the OECD with incomes per capita of around US$30,000) is now poised to become a 
major source of new developmental finance in Africa. 
There are, however, other evaluations offered elsewhere of this growing presence not 
discussed above. One is the claim that despite all the benefits, China’s growing presence 
is also co-mingled with responses to attempts to discipline corrupt practices at home and 
this amount to exported corruption. Stories of Chinese enterprises approaching African 
governments offering reserve financed low interest loan infrastructure projects on 
conditions that contracts are awarded to specified Chinese enterprises tend to underscore 
such concerns, and emphasize the incentive to conduct business lax accounting standard 
jurisdictions in Africa. Another is claims by local unions of low wage employment of 
local workers on the continent by Chinese enterprises, and even displacement of local 
labor by arriving Chinese labor. Both arguments have been used to suggest negative 
consequences follow for Africa from a growing Chinese presence. 
In the bigger picture, however, we would argue that such claims have to be seen 
alongside the large benefits flowing to Africa from China’s involvement. Whether or not 
corruption at home motivates some amount of FDI, Africa seems to benefit. Meanwhile, 
labor adjustments from Chinese FDI appear to be small, especially given the large FDI in 
oil and resources. The bottom line would seem to be that large trade and investment 
benefits have already accrued to Africa from China’s growing presences, and more seem 
poised to follow. China in Africa is thus seemingly a highly positive story for Africa and 
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